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ABSTRACT
Given the advances in technology the field of social network analysis has very much hit
the forefront in recent years. The information age harnesses the use of social network
analysis for multiple industries and for solving complex problems. Social network analysis
is an important tool in the world of the military and counter intelligence, whether it’s the
capture of Osama Bin Laden or uncovering hidden Al Qaeda terrorist networks, the world
around us is built on networks, be that hidden or otherwise.
Online social networks give new information in the world of intelligence agencies
similarly online financial communities such as Yahoo Finance gives intelligent
information to knowledge hungry investors. This thesis is concerned with the exploration
and exploitation of online financial community dynamics and networks using social
network analysis (SNA) as a mechanism. Social network analysis measurement techniques
will be applied to understand the reaction of online investors to military and terrorist
geopolitical events, the stock market’s reaction to these events and if it is possible to
predict military stock prices after military and terrorist geopolitical events.
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CHAPTER 1
1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with establishing military and terrorist geopolitical events that
have a measureable influence on military stocks and what influence online financial
communities have in conjunction to military stock price movements utilising current
online financial market community communication. The model will seek to gauge the
reaction of online investors to military and terrorist

geopolitical events, the

stock

market’s reaction to these events and based on the gathered intelligence, a prediction
model will be utilised to try and determine future military stock movements for
geopolitical events measured against the S&P 500. The ultimate aim is to establish a
framework that aims to understand how military and terrorist geopolitical events are
reflected in financial markets using Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a knowledge
management tool.
This document is broken into a number of sections. The thesis to this dissertation and the
number of experiments conducted. Chapter 2 will give a brief history of some important
military and terrorist geopolitical events and feature military and terrorist geopolitics
within the financial arena by providing a background of what these events consist of and
how they are defined within the thesis. Some of the key questions posed by social network
analyses and its value will be addressed in this section. Chapter 3 will consist of the
literature review and will look at the concepts associated with social network analysis and
the evolution of same thus including a number of disciplines’ and techniques, which
incorporate the following: Betweeness, Centrality, Clustering Coefficient, Degree,
Density, Diameter and Modularity. The element of data mining to this thesis is not the
fundamental core objective of the experiments it is a mechanism used herein for data
extraction and discovery. Data extracts consisting of online communication will be taken
from Yahoo Finance forums for each of the relevant stocks. Section 4 will outline the
statistical and data mining methods. Section 5 deals with the experiment approach and
implementations for each experiment and the analysis of the results. Section 6 will
summarise and conclude the thesis.
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The scientific belief of this thesis is that the applied social network analyses and
prediction model may help investors understand how military and terrorist geopolitical
events can affect their investments i.e. portfolio stock prices and how online financial
communities react and relate to geopolitical events in addition to understanding the effect
of these events on future military stock price movement. Moreover by providing this
research strategists may know what to expect in terms of precedent set forth by previous
geopolitical military and terrorist events.
1.1

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How do online financial communities react to military and terrorist geopolitical events?
2. How does the stock market react to military and terrorist geopolitical events?
3. Can military stocks prices be predicted after a military or terrorist geopolitical event?
1.2

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experimental design follows a procedure that can be described in the following steps:
1. Establish a research base for social network analysis and online financial communities.
2. Define the information and data points needed to support each variable for each of the
experiments.
3. Utilise a parser to mine the Yahoo Finance online financial community communication.
4. Establish, define and classify quantitative SNA metrics exclusive to the experiments.
5. Compare and contrast the SNA metrics against online communities before and after
geopolitical events.
6. Compare and contrast the prices of military stocks before and after geopolitical events.
7. Compare and contrast military stock price movements against the S&P 500 index
before and after geopolitical events.
8. Perform a concluding analysis to the outcome of each experiment.
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CHAPTER 2
2

MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICS ON THE RISE…

Chapter two looks at the rise of military and terrorist geopolitics in the modern day world
and what effect geopolitics has on nations. It also looks at military spending and defines
geopolitical categories that are in scope for this thesis. The chapter also focuses on some
of the past and most recent military and terrorist geopolitical events and what effect they
had on the market. Fundamental social network analysis questions key to this thesis are
also addressed.
Geopolitical events are somewhat quite difficult to predict and often investment decisions
rarely incorporate geopolitical risk. Geopolitical risks are always a potential pitfall for any
investment decision process, with geopolitical risk on the rise, one can conceive the world
is an unsafe place as is the world of investment decision making. With the end of the Cold
war, technology brought about a sense of globalisation, privatisation and an increase in
state owned industries and state intergovernmental generated propaganda. For a while
global economies focused on their internal infrastructures whilst the wage of war
subsided, a paradigm shift in the decrease of defence spending begun to have longitudinal
consequences. The world appeared to be more peaceful. The subprime machine was in full
swing moving from country to country, continent to continent which encouraged a
glorious sense of prosperity and economic indulgence.
Since the crumble of the tsunami of cheap credit and in some cases sovereign debt
economic and financial market activity has become increasing more volatile. Events
should as the Arab spring, 9/11 terrorist attacks and the rise of nuclear weapon capabilities
have had a profound effect on global markets and localised manufacturing output.
Evidence has demonstrated that geopolitical events shape economies, generate wealth,
even if that is just short term gains. Geopolitics can potentially shape investment decision
making thus enhancing countries prosperity. These events can give rise to shrew real time
investment decisions thus determining how markets behave. In the current political
environment tensions are high between countries as a result of natural resource scarcity,
oil, gas, nuclear energy capabilities, have the ability to create wide scale controversy and
militant events.
3

Nations have resorted to more draconian measures to kick-start their economies. The
threat of war is a method that generates volatility within the financial markets. Nathan
Rothschild, one of the founders of the Rothschild banking dynasty, is probably the single
investor most associated with profiting from conflict and the related geopolitics. The
network of agents and investments he built across Europe in the early 1800s enabled him
to learn of Wellington's victory at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 ahead of other investors.
He sold heavily, driving the market down and encouraging others to sell, too, only to
quietly buy again before the victory became known and markets rose. He is said to have
coined the maxim: "Buy on the sound of cannons, sell on the sound of trumpets." Dyson
(2013)
The proliferation of low and high intensity warfare features prominently in this thesis,
such that the chosen geopolitical warfare events can be split up into two categories: A
third category exists as deemed below although all of the data has been sourced, it is not in
scope for this project because of time limitations. Table 1 illustrates same below.
However, it can be used for a future experiment.
1

Natural Resource and Energy Geopolitics: Access to oil, gas and countries that
want to extract and mine foreign state energy reserves. Examples include the
Libyan Revolution and the current Ukrainian Crises.

2

Income and Ideological Geopolitics: Refers to terrorist activity and political
attacks from terrorist groups and rebel insurgency outfits against domestic
governments. The Syrian conflict would embody this ideology.

3

National Strategic Geopolitics: Consists of nuclear activity ambitions, such as
plutonium and Uranium manufacturing for the use in nuclear weapons. The Iran
Nuclear crises and the North Korean nuclear crises personifies same.

Table 1 Geopolitical categorisation
Military expenditure has been on the rise since the end of the cold war. World military
expenditure in 2012 is estimated to have reached $1.756 trillion. The USA with its
massive spending budget has long been the principal determinant of the current world
trend, often accounting for close to half of the entire world’s military expenditure. The
4

effects of global financial crisis and the post Iraq and Afghanistan military operations have
seen a decline in its spending; now accounting for 39% of spending in 2012. (Global
Issues). Figure 1 illustrates the World Military expenditure. To this end, the stock
selection focuses on American military stocks. Interesting in today’s world strategic
power between heavy weight nations are less defined, the great superpower giants of
yesteryear

are now focusing their battle for supremacy by aligning their military

sovereignty, technology and science with the emerging nations and rebel insurgency
groups to not only increase their personal GDP, but also to quash the rise of religious
beliefs.

Figure 1 World Military spending 2003 - 2012
2.1

MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICS AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

Sam Stovall, chief equity strategist at S&P Capital IQ, conducted a broad study last
year of how U.S. stocks reacted since World War II to anything ranging from wars, near
wars, assassinations, assassination attempts, terrorist attacks and financial collapses. In the
14 examples he cited, he found a running theme: Stocks initially sold off, but then didn’t
take long to rebound and recover those losses. The chart below, courtesy of S&P Capital
IQ, expands upon those examples (WSJ)
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Figure 2 Shocks to the system: Market declines and recovery since WWII
Focusing on terrorist and warfare events, it took the S&P 500 18 and 19 days to recover
from the 9/11 and Madrid attacks respectively. The Pearl Harbour attack took the biggest
single warfare S&P 500 recovery with 257 days. What is striking is the bottomed out %
change in the 9/11 attack and the Pearl Harbour attack. Percentage wise its quite similar
11.6% and 10.8% even though the days to recovery gap appear to have no correlation. It
could potentially appear that modern day investors have adapted to military geopolitical
events as a result of their alarming frequency and predetermined precedents. However
when the world appeared to be on the brink of disaster during the Cuban missile crises’,
the market only took a mere 5 days to recover from the bottomed out position. Crises not
related to terror and warfare attacks such as the Lehman bankruptcy have had even more
ephemeral resonance for the market, nevertheless this evidence illustrates that terrorism
and warfare have initial negative effects on the markets.
Company stock prices and the stock markets in general can be influenced by world events
such as war, civil unrest and terrorism. These influences can be direct and indirect and
they often occur in chain reactions. For example, the social uncertainty and fear generated
by the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 affected markets directly as they caused
many investors in the United States to trade less and to focus on stocks and bonds with
less risk. From my own personal experience whilst working on the Convertible trading
desk for an American derivate firm on that ill-fated day, the direction was to sell all stocks
6

correlated to the attack (e.g. airlines stocks) and shift the capital to debt instruments such
as US Government bonds and Treasury Bills. Indirectly, you can expect the stocks of
military equipment companies and weapons manufacturers to rise in value as a nation
gears up for armed conflict due to increased demand.
War affects the value of assets above all else. Even the suggestion of a war in the Middle
East is often enough for the price of crude oil to sky-rocket due to the region being such a
major oil exporter. Oil stocks have a negative correlation so rising oil prices due to
political unrest usually signals falling stock prices, especially those stocks denominated in
dollars and energy stocks.
It is perhaps not surprising that some economists point to a potential economic upside to
war. War at times can kick-start a struggling economy especially its manufacturing base
when forced to concentrate its efforts on war time production. Think of the United States
in World War II. The U.S.’s entry into the war following the attacks on Pearl Harbour
almost instantly pulled the country out of the grips of the Great Depression Banc De
Binary (2014)
Dyson (2013) looked at analysis conducted by Deutsche Bank, which was circulated to its
institutional clients, which studied 12 conflicts over the past 30 years. The first was the
missile strike ordered by President Reagan on Libya in April 1986. This was a response to
the bombing, 10 days earlier, of a Berlin nightclub in which American soldiers were
killed. The most recent of the 12 conflicts analysed by Deutsche was the March 2011
deployment of aircraft over Libya i.e. Operation Ellamy, when a coalition of Western
states including Britain intervened in the Libyan civil war. Between these two conflicts
Deutsche Bank looked at 10 other events involving US and Western forces, including the
1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Iraqi Kurdish conflict, the Afghanistan war in late 2001 and the
2003 Iraq war. With each event, analysts sought to identify a precise date on which the US
entered the conflict, and then study the market either side of this date by examining the
commonly followed S&P 500 index of leading US companies. Three data points were
collected for each event: the highest point in the three months preceding the strike date,
the strike date itself and the market's position one month after the strike date. In all 12
cases the market on the strike date was below the high point of the three previous months,
7

although the fall varied. The smallest drop was 1pc (Bosnia, August 1995) and the largest
15pc (Afghanistan, 2001).
The data relating to the weeks after the strike was more dramatic. Although many of those
conflicts would drag on for months or years, the S&P 500 tended to rise sharply after
intervention. In every single case the index rose during the month following the strike, by
as much as 18pc (the 1991 Gulf War). In seven cases out of 12 the S&P 500 reached a
higher point one month after the strike date than the highest point in the three months
before it. Overall, across the 12 conflicts the S&P 500 fell by an average of 5.9pc from a
high point in the three months preceding the strike to the strike day itself. In the following
month the average rally was 7pc. Revisiting Nathan Rothschild famous words from 1815
“Buy on the sound of canons” suggests that this investment strategy would appear still be
widely practiced.
Bremmer and Keat (2009) state “a growing number of investors and policymakers
understand the importance of political risk. Yet they also know that they lack a
comprehensive and systemic set of tools for evaluating these risks” With the application of
SNA to online financial communities in times of geopolitical events some key questions
arise. Can historical SNA online financial community mined data and historical
geopolitical military and terrorist events be used to form future prediction geopolitical
military models for Investment banks? Can future geopolitical military prediction models
be classed as a business asset for the Investment banking Industry? Is there value in
providing an automated algorithmic application that will mine historical SNA, geopolitical
military and terrorists events to buy and sell military associated stocks once intelligent
systems realise pending geopolitical events are unfolding, for example the application of
Nathan Rothschild’s rule in alliance with the parameters set forth from the Deutsche Bank
report. Furthermore could this become a commercially viable product?
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CHAPTER 3
3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 3 contains the literature review. The literature review of this thesis will seek to
provide a basis for the experimental approach by doing so the literature review will start
by introducing the world of SNA inclusive of social capital, small world and SNA theory
and provide a review of existing methodologies and papers in the field. Thereafter existing
approaches to handing and exploring social network analysis techniques will be discussed.
3.1

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Given the advances in technology the field of social network analysis has very much hit
the forefront in recent years. The information age harnesses the use of social network
analysis for multiple industries and for solving complex problems. Whilst my project is
concerned with the use of SNA for online financial communities discussing stocks, there
are many areas that the SNA science can be applied to. Wasserman and Faust state “Social
network analysis is inherently an indisplincinary endeavour” SNA has its roots associated
with many disciplines these include social sciences, applied mathematics, statistical and
computing methodology
Social media services, such as Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, among others, create a
wealth of data that has the potential to provide new insights to marketers, social scientists,
community administrators, and system developers. Much of this data comes in the form of
networks: people connected via friend and follow relationships, websites connected via
hyperlinks, and books connected to other books based on shared purchasing patterns. Over
the past decades, researchers have developed sophisticated techniques for analysing and
visualising network data, particularly social network data Hansen et al (2009).
Communication patterns were modelled in the “Analysis of Facebook Social Network” the
intention was to offer a unique perspective of how society functions and to uncover hidden
relationships in the Facebook network Akhtar et al (2013).
As pointed out in the Gartner study, this huge development in social networks leads to the
growing need for social network mining and SNA methods in order to provide deeper
comprehension of the networks and to detect communities. SNA has found applications in
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various areas like computer science, life sciences, law enforcement agencies, civil society
organisations, network operators Gartner (2008).
Typically the SNA will look to analyse all connections between the nodes (or vertices). In
Wen-Chih Chang “Applied Social Network Analysis to Project Curriculum (2010)” paper
he used a model based on six degrees of separation theory. The aim and objective in the
social network analysis was to represent the strength of relationships between team
members but also to illustrate the individual role in his (/her) own network. Thus, the team
member can observe what the role they play in the team and how to strengthen
communicative skills with their partners. From an organisational perspective this can be
used as a knowledge management tool to understand the strengths and weakness of each
of the nodes on the network.
Work such as “Do you know the way to SNA” undertook an experiment to understand how
graduates could apply SNA to data from online communities. What becomes clear is the
fact that SNA tools are very much in their infancy in terms of ease of use, unlike tools
such as Google Analytics. Hansen et al (2009) demonstrates through their experiments
that SNA tools graduates can effectively grasp the working of SNA within a short space of
time; however the experiment does make reference to the fact that the SNA practise would
benefit more if there was a toolset that reduced processing complexity. It could be
perceived that the SNA toolset or metrics outlined in this thesis could have potential merit
in terms of a standard SNA framework.
Kristin Forbes Robert Rigobon (2002) “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring
Stock Market Co-movements," paper aimed to understand contagion coefficients in times
of market crisis during the events of the Mexican peso collapse, the 87 US stock Market
Crash and the Asian crisis. The measurement of same appeared to be quite manual and
labour intensive. It could be argued that use of a SNA tools for this particular experiment
may have uncovered a greater degree of correlation or indeed a greater discovery of high
market co movement.
Antweiler W, Frank MZ (2004) researched the idea that the markets are influenced by
negative and positive news in times of crisis and this has a strong correlation to
geopolitical events. More than 1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance and
Raging Bull about 45 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones
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Internet Index, by measuring bullishness. They found that stock messages helped to
predict market volatility both on a daily base and also within the same trading day. More
specifically, they found that higher message postings predicted negative subsequent
returns
More recently Bollen J, Mao H, Zeng X (2011) found that Twitter mood predicted more
than 80% of daily volatility of closing values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The
use of SNA in both of these experiments highlights the value of the SNA toolset in terms
of financial and monetary gain. Gloor et al (2009) demonstrated that useful trends can be
identified using SNA by calculating the betweenness’s centrality for online communities.
Khonsari, K.K. et al (2010) found that political groups also find use for SNA. In the social
network analysis of” Iran’s Green Movement Opposition Groups using Twitter” paper the
SNA aimed to identify the structure of the Green party using the twitter application to
voice their disapproval and opposition that they perceived to be a fraudulent election.
In the world of counterterrorism, social network analysis can effectively become the social
“terror” network analysis. Governments and intelligence agencies now use SNA as a tool
to prevent terrorism. The SNA methods deployed are no different from the methods
applied elsewhere in this literature review. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, many
researchers have started to apply social network analysis in the fields of counter-terrorism,
which has become a new and popular tool for counter-terrorism research. Such
information as social relationships among terrorists, correlations of terrorists during
planning, organising and conducting terrorist activities as well as time and locations of
terrorist activities provides a basis for analysing terrorist networks Julei Fu et al (2012)
Similarity Krebs (2002) “Mapping Networks of Terrorist cells” used publically available
data to map the 9/11 terrorist network. To capture the data for the SNA Krebs collected
data pertaining to the hijacker’s links and relationships from data pertaining to major
newspaper articles for a few weeks after the attack.
3.2

SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

One of the most fundamental aspects of social capital theory is that SNA represents value;
all social ties in various networks can be conceived as channels for the flow of data,
information and knowledge. The structure represents the value of the network. A number
of SNA metrics which represent the value will be discussed herein.

Colman (1998)
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outlines that “Two main characteristics are common for all forms of social capital: (i)
they comprise a part of the social structure and (ii) they facilitate the actions of
individuals in that structure” Theoretically social capital is normally associated with
capital in monetary terms, however in a metaphorical sense social capital in SNA refers to
value and strength of the ties and entities of the network. Moreover Mark Granovetter
work on in his widely cited 1973 article “The Strength of Weak Ties,” argues that “weak
ties” are more important than “strong ties” and that includes your relationships with
family and close friends when trying to find employment. Granovetter’s article and
subsequent research extended this argument by positing that more disperse, nonredundant, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller,
denser, and more interconnected networks because they supply more diversity of
knowledge and information.
Chung et al (2013) relays a classic example of trading in the diamond market in New York
where bags of diamonds often worth thousands of dollars were exchanged amongst
merchants frequently to other merchants for them to inspect at their own leisure.
Considering that this was done without any formal insurance, an objective observer might
think it to be risky as there could be potential for opportunities of fraud and theft.
However, the market was extremely successful and efficient. Coleman argued that the
market worked because of closeness, high degree of trust and trustworthiness amongst the
merchants; thus attributing the success of the markets to high levels of social capital.
Considering we will be reviewing terrorist networks in terms of SNA metrics Perliger, et
al (2011) definition of social capital becomes appealing

“One of the main advantages

which SNA provides for students of terrorists groups is the capability to uncover the
informal division of influence and social capital within the group, which, in turn,
influences the group’s internal political and social processes and the outcome of its
activities”
Likewise within online financial communities social capital exists as does weak and
strong ties and as per Colman’s theory social structures will emerge from the shadows.
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3.3

IT’S A SMALL WORLD

A distinguished gentleman is sitting in a side walk café in Venice, needing a light for a
cigarette. He asks the man next to his table for a light. They fall into conversation; the man
at the table is an American who spent time in Ireland during the Celtic tiger years in the
financial district. “This may appear to be a silly question” says the distinguished
gentleman “however did you ever hear of a person called Martin O Farrell Usher?”
“Martin O Farrell Usher from Oldcastle, tall, handsome chap” said the American. “Yes”
said the gentleman. “I don’t believe it!” said the American; “I know him well and his
family!” “That’s incredulous” replied the gentleman, “Good Lord it’s a small world”
Almost all of us have had this experience, where we have encountered a stranger far from
home and much to our surprise they share a mutual acquaintance. This type of experience
occurs with sufficient frequency such that almost everyone says “It’s a small world”
One of the best known and earliest SNA experiments was conducted by professor Stanley
Milgram in 1967.The experiment consisted of mailing 160 letters to randomly chosen
individuals in Nebraska. Once each recipient received the letter the objective was then to
get the letter to a Stockbroker in Boston using intermediaries known to one another on a
first name basis. In all 42 letters reached the target destination. This experiment became
known as the “Small world effect”. Milgram’s experiment was designed to explore the
properties of social networks: interconnecting bonds of friendship among individuals in a
society. Amongst the letters that arrived at the desired location, it was derived that the
average path length was 6; this led to the phrase, “the six degrees of separation”. What
was of significance was the empirically gained insight into the configuration aspects, of
social networks which laid the foundation for most of the concluding work. Milgram
(1967) points to the following:
(i) In those chains, participants were three times more, likely to contact people of the
same gender.
(ii) Many chains passed through the same few people – stars – as the last step before
reaching the target person. (iii) Although physical distance is important in the chains of
intermediaries, social distance seems even more important.
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The Small World Effect describes that network size does not have any effect on length of
ties among nodes. In other words, the distance between any pair of nodes is much smaller
than the size of the network
3.4

SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY

One way we can think about social networks is to use the mathematical discipline of graph
theory. Graphs are defined as a collection of points called vertices that are connected in
pairs by lines called Edges Oram (2001). When sociologists borrowed this way of
graphing things from the mathematicians, they renamed their graphs as "sociograms".
There are a number of variations on the theme of sociograms, but they all share the
common feature of using a labelled circle for each actor in the population we are
describing, and line segments between pairs of actors to represent the observation that a tie
exists between the two. Visualisation by displaying a sociogram as well as a summary of
graph theoretical concepts provides a first description of social network data Mohsen
Jamali and Hassan Abolhassani (2012).
“…the workers have – whether aware of it or not – formed themselves into a group with
appropriate customs, duties, routines, even rituals” (Mayo, 1971)
Elton Mayo most famous for the Hawthorn experiments stated that the industrial world at
the beginning of the twentieth century was more technologically advanced than ever
before while being more socially incompetent than ever Bendix & Fisher (1949). In his
studies of factory work and interactions between workers, Mayo pioneered the use of
sociograms to depict interpersonal relations and group structure and was thus among the
first to systematically depict the importance of spontaneous cooperation being organised
by workers. Moreover, Mayo noticed that managers who had some level of understanding
of the social processes such as group solidarity among workers had a greater ability to
control and influence worker behavior Scott, J., (2000). Finally, Mayo explicitly linked
socio-emotional issues with productivity through cooperation and job satisfaction Mayo
(1971). This created the point of departure for not only the Human Relations school but
also of the study of the informal structures and the focus on relations as the unit of
analysis Mayo, (1939), which is the most central issue of SNA.
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Berkowitz (1982) states that social network analysis is a set of research procedures for
identifying structures in systems based on the relations among actors. Grounded in graph
and system theories, this approach has proven to be a powerful tool for studying networks
in physical and social worlds, including on the web. Faust (1997) declares that SNA
focuses on relations and ties in studying actor’s behavior and attitudes. Thus the positions
of actors within a network and the strength of ties between them become critically
important. Social positions can be evaluated by finding the centrality of a node identified
through a number of connections among network members. Such measures are used to
characterise degrees of influence, prominence and importance of certain members.
Networks are interchangeable and consonantly evolving, network activity may change
from day to day as each node activity may increase or decrease over the lifespan of the
network. Social network analysis is a distinct research perspective within the social and
behavioral sciences, as the social network perspective is based on the assumption of the
importance on relational concepts or processes between individuals. Wasserman and Faust
(1994) noted four characterising principles of social network analysis.
(1) Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than independent,
autonomous units.
(2) Relational ties (linkages) between actors are channels for transfer or 'flow' of
resources (either material or nonmaterial)
(3) Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as
providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action.
(4) Network models conceptualise structure (social, economic, political, and so forth) as
lasting patterns of relations among actors.
Jacob Levi Moreno, was heavily involved in advancing the notion of sociometry (i.e. the
measurement of social relationships) this involved the plotting of social relations, this had
been a project that had been progressing since the First World War According to Moreno.
The brutality and meaninglessness of the war prompted social scientists to reconsider their
views of society and the place of the individual within it and in an effort to understand the
emancipation and dispersement of a common structured civil society. Moreno created
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actors as nodes and denoted the ties with lines. Moreno presents the following definition:
“Sociometric procedures try to lay bare the fundamental structures within a society by
disclosing the affinities, attractions and repulsions, operation between persons and
persons and between persons and objects” Moreno (1937).
3.5

SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS AND METRICS

Theoretically social network activity depends on the movement of its actors. An actor or
otherwise known as a node on the network can refer to a person or entity that has an
interaction with another person or entity. The most important property of an actor is the
measure of centrality in the network. Any relationships between actors are referred to as a
tie, which typically links the pair together. A pair of actors with interconnecting ties
between them is known as a “Dyad”.

Similarly where three actors exist with

interconnecting ties, this is known as a “Triad”. A “Subgroup “can consist of dyads and
Triads in any social network. Wasserman and Faust (1994) refer to a group as “a
collection of all actors on which ties are too be measured” further to the definition they
state that “once one decides to gather data on a group, a more concrete meaning of the
term is necessary. A group then consists of a finite set or sets of actors who for
conceptual, theoretical or empirical reasons are treated as a finite set of individuals on
which network measurements are made”. The strength of the tie is denoted by the
frequency and duration of contact of use over a period of time. In the case of this thesis
the groups will consists of all of the actors associated with a single stock from the online
financial communities.
There are two types of variables that can be included in a network data set: structural and
composition. Structural variables are measured on pairs of actors and are the cornerstone
of social network datasets. Structural variables measure ties of a specific kind between
pairs of actors. For example structural variables can measure business transactions
between corporations, friendships between people or trade between nations. Actors
comprising these pairs usually belong to a single set of actors.
Composition variables are measurements of actors attributes, Composition variables, or
actor attribute variables, are of the standard social and behavioral science variety and are
defined at the level of individual actors. For example we might record gender, race or
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ethnicity for people, or geographical location, after tax profits or numbers of employees
for corporations Wasserman and Faust (1994). The social networks that form part of the
experiments contained herein will be largely based on structured variables, that form a
“two mode network” which can be described as a network that focuses largely on one set
of actors (i.e. the Yahoo Finance online financial community for a particular stocks) and
one set of events (the actual listed geopolitical war or terrorist listed in chapter 5)
3.5.1 GRAPH THEORY
Graph theory is essential and at the core of SNA. Graph theory is used in the identification
of the most influential actors in the network. Metrics that can be derived from the graph
theory are outlined herein. The prominence of actors can be measured in terms of
centrality within the network. When a graph is used as a model of a social network, points
(called nodes) are used to represent actors, and lines connecting the points are used to
represent the ties between the actors. In this sense a graph is a model of a social network
in the same way that a model train set is a model of a railway system Wasserman and
Faust (1994). Nodes or actors can also be referred to as vertices or points, lines are
commonly known as edges and sometimes arcs. Social network graphs consists of two
sets of information, a number or set of nodes N = {n1, n2 n3} and a set of lines L = {l1,
l2, l3} between pairs of nodes where N = Nodes and L = Lines. Ties are either present or
nonexistent between actors, thus indicating an undirected dichotomous relation. Non
directional relations include informal groupings. Wasserman and Faust (1994) state “In a
graph of a social network with a single non-directional dichotomous, relation, the node
represent actors, and the lines represent the ties that exist between pairs of actors on the
relation” Graphs are essential to display the network variables for visualisation purposes.
To display the output of the experiments in graph format the open source product Gephi
will be used. SNA methods and Metrics (2011) refer in the most common sense of the
term, a graph is an ordered pair G = (V, E) comprising a set V of vertices or nodes
together with a set E of edges or lines, which are 2-element subsets of V (i.e., an edge is
related with two vertices, and the relation is represented as unordered pair of the vertices
with respect to the particular edge). To avoid ambiguity, this type of graph may be
described precisely as undirected and simple. In graph theory, a vertex (plural vertices) or
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node is the fundamental unit out of which graphs are formed: an undirected graph consists
of a set of vertices and a set of edges (unordered pairs of vertices), while a directed graph
consists of a set of vertices and a set of arcs (ordered pairs of vertices). From the point of
view of graph theory, vertices are treated as featureless and indivisible objects, although
they may have additional structure depending on the application from which the graph
arises; for instance, a semantic network is a graph in which the vertices represent concepts
or classes of objects. The two vertices forming an edge are said to be its endpoints, and the
edge is said to be incident to the vertices. A vertex w is said to be adjacent to another
vertex v if the graph contains an edge (v, w). The neighborhood of a vertex v is an induced
subgraph of the graph, formed by all vertices adjacent to v. The degree of a vertex in a
graph is the number of edges incident to it. An isolated vertex is a vertex with degree zero;
that is, a vertex that is not an endpoint of any edge. A leaf vertex (also pendant vertex) is a
vertex with degree one. In a directed graph, one can distinguish the out-degree (number of
outgoing edges) from the in-degree (number of incoming edges); a source vertex is a
vertex with in-degree zero, while a sink vertex is a vertex with out-degree zero.
3.5.2 CENTRALISATION
The Centralisation concept refers to the difference between the number of ties for each
node divided by maximum possible sum of differences. A centralised network will have
many of its links dispersed around one or a few nodes, while a decentralised network is
one in which there is little variation between the numbers of ties each node possesses. The
idea of centrality as applied to human communication was introduced by Bavelas in 1948.
Chung et al (2013) uses the following definition Centralisation explains the extent to
which the connectedness is focused around a particular node. To measure centralisation
in a network, we need to observe the differences in the centrality values of the most central
nodes and all the other nodes. Then, to arrive at the centralisation value, we calculate the
ratio of the sum of actual differences and the sum of the maximum possible differences.
Centralisation is thus defined as:
∑

(
(

)(

)
)
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Where (

) is the number of people in the network that are directly linked to a person?

The number of actors is represented by

in this equation.

Perliger et al (2011) looked at In-betweenness as the division of power within a group. His
paper focused on the Jewish Terror organisation who were a group of religious zealots
who were responsible for terrorist attacks against Arabs in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem In defining the actors on the network that have unique characteristics, First is
the classic hub, or an actor that has a significantly higher number of ties than other
members (high level of centrality). Such a member is, in many cases, responsible for
coordinating the group’s activities, for recruitment of members, and has the ability to
manipulate the flow of information within the group more easily. Figure 3 illustrates what
Perliger refers to as the classic hub, in other words the hive of activity. To illustrate, in the
case of the Israeli Jewish Underground terrorist group the hubs intentionally did not reveal
the long-term highly extreme goals of the group to some members in order not to alienate
them from participating in short-term less extreme operations. The hubs were able to do
that not just because of their high level of centrality, but since entire sections of the
network were dependent on them for connection with other parts of the network (high
level of betweenness). Since a relatively high number of members were tied to the
network via a specific hub, this also implies that the hubs were responsible for recruitment
processes. Finally, the importance of detecting the hubs stems not just from the fact that
this allows us to uncover the power division within the network and who possesses more
social capital (Bourdieu 1986) but also to better understand the motives beyond the
group’s actions. As demonstrated by Pedahzur and Perliger, (2006), by looking at the
characteristics and history of the hubs, the researchers were able to detect the motivations
behind the attacks of the studied networks of Palestinian suicide bombers, epitomising that
the “hubs” will, in many cases, use the networks to promote personal or local political
interests.
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Figure 3 The Jewish Underground Terrorist group
The case of the Jewish Underground also exemplifies that a high number of ties is not the
only criteria for detecting informal leaders. While some groups pose a dense structure,
others are constructed as bundle of connected subgroups. In this case, the actors who are
in strategic locations and serve as connectors between the different subgroups possess
significant power and are crucial for the survival of the network. While they do not have
to be connected to high numbers of members, they can veto almost any operation that
needs the cooperation of the different subgroups. Finally, there are those who do not have
a particularly large number of ties, nor are they connectors between different parts of the
network, but they are situated in a strategic location in terms of their proximity to hubs or
to large numbers of members within the network; hence, they have high level of access to
information and resources. Chug et al (2013) refer to online social networks and the way
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in which people socially engage with each other. They go further by stating “ In network
parlance, this pattern is suggestive of assortativity - the tendency in networks where
individual actors connect with other actors who are similar to themselves based on
certain characteristics . Thus, in the example of OSNs and its users, assortativity can be
defined in terms of attributes such as willingness, frequency of usage or use per se of the
OSNs for community building. From a networks perspective, one could also assess
network assortativity, or the homophily of the OSN based on the number of messages one
sends and/or receives. For instance, in the Twitter social network, it has been shown that
happy users tend to connect to happy users whereas unhappy users tend to be
predominantly connected to unhappy users measured by the Subject Well-being index.
This was attributed to two mechanisms: (i) homophily -where “birds of a feather flock
together” and (ii) mood contagion - where unhappy actors converged to other unhappy
actors thus making them unhappier”
Therefore it’s arguable that assortabiity and centralisation have a correlation.
(i) Homophily - i.e. terrorist groups, online financial communities: Each has a common
goal, to receive, retrieve, capture and execute information and knowledge
ii) Mood shared interest: Depending on the severity of the geopolitical event, this could
potentially affect an online community’s behavior.
3.5.3 DEGREE CENTRALITY
To understand the importance of nodes on a graph, Degree centrality is used. The
centrality measurement is concerned with finding influential people on the network;
however it is also concerned with the number of degrees of the user. The centrality of a
node depends on the number of nodes attached to it directly. It can be best described as
where most of the activity is occurring on the network and is commonly used to
understand the potency or might of the information authority on the network. Kretschmer
(2010) outlines: The original used measures of social network analysis (SNA) are related
to Wassermann & Faust
The Degree Centrality (DCA) of a node A is equal to the number of nodes (or ties) to
which this node is connected. For example, in collaboration networks in armies the degree
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centrality of a node A is equal to the number of node collaborators or senior army
personnel. An actor (node) with a high degree centrality is active in collaboration. That
node has collaborated with many armies. In correspondence with Wassermann and Faust
the Group Degree Centralisation quantifies the variability or dispersion of the individual
Degree Centralities of the nodes. Centralisation describes the extent to which the links
(ties) are organised around particular focal nodes, i.e. it provides a measure on the extent
to which a whole network has a centralised structure. There are several degree based
measures of graph centralisation. One of them is as follows:
GDC = ∑
(

)(

(
(

)
)(

)

) reaches its maximum value of 1 when one actor (node) has collaborated

with all other v-1 actor, and the other actors interact only with this one, central actor. This
is exactly the case in a star graph. The index attains its minimum value of 0 when all
degrees are equal. Therefore, representing the weight graph is very necessary in finding
the influential people. In summary the unweighted measure means the ties (or nodes) are
counted independently from the strength of the ties. If the network is directed (meaning
that ties have direction), then we usually define two separate measures of degree
centrality, namely in-degree and out degree. In-degree is a count of the number of ties
directed to the node, and out-degree is the number of ties that the node directs to others.
Kretschmer method could be potentially suitable for the case of online communities, as it
focuses on the number of interactions between nodes inclusive of reply interactions.
Referring to Roy, R.B.; Sarkar, U.K (2011), the Degree centrality method was used to
identify influential stocks in the global market using various centrality measures and
examine change in their ranks following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the USA. The
findings from the social network concluded that there was dominance in terms of
geographical positioning. European stocks were seen to be more influential than global
stocks in terms of stock market behavior based on a degree centrality. Rachman et al
(2013) used degree centrality method to discover the highest frequency of tweets; retweets
and replies in the twitter application to locate the most important influential person on the
network. Koochakzadeh et al (2012) created a social network of financial expert’s in an
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effort to allow novice investors model their investment behavior on similar likeminded
financial experts. Behavior similarities are taken into account and the social network is
then used to recommend an appropriate managed portfolio to non-professional investors
based on their behavioral similarities to the expert investors. The degree centralities of
each expert investor were measured, the highest centralities represented the low risk
investors and investors that shared the same appetite for risk were aligned accordingly to
that portfolio investment strategy. Zheng Chen and Xiaoqing Du (2013) use degree
metrics to understand the interactions from the Shanghai/Shenzhen stock exchange, and
the online Chinese stock forum Guba.com.cn. The paper is concerned with understanding
online behavior in relation to stock movements. Their experiment uses two degree
methods: the average degree which represents the strength of the users and the standard
degree which shows how much variation or dispersion exist from the average node.
3.5.4 DENSITY
Network density represents the actual number of ties in a network as a ratio of the total
maximum ties that are possible with all the nodes of the network. A fully dense network
has a network density value of 1, which indicates that all nodes are connected to each
other. A network with a density value near 0 indicates that it is a sparsely knit network.
Hence, density is a measure of network cohesiveness. For a directed graph with
density

nodes,

is defined as
∑
(

)

Krebs (2002) “Mapping Networks of Terrorist cells” used publically available data to map
the 9/11 terrorist network. To capture the data for the SNA Krebs collected data pertaining
to the hijacker’s links and relationships from major newspaper for a few weeks after the
attack. The SNA illustrated how sparse the network was and how distant i.e. “low density”
many of the hijackers on the same team were from each other. Many pairs of team
members were beyond the horizon of observability from each other. A strategy for
keeping cell members distant from each other, and from other cells, minimises damage to
the network if a cell member is captured or otherwise compromised. Osama bin Laden
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even described this plan in his infamous videotape, which was found in Afghanistan. In
the transcript (U.S. Department of Defence, 2001) Osama bin Laden mentions:
"Those who were trained to fly didn't know the others. One group of people did not know
the other group." Judging from this statement its clear the terrorist group had a clear
strategy for managing the control of information and knowledge via actors on the network.
What is interesting here is, did the terrorist group use a SNA model to ensure the
distribution of knowledge and information was kept to a minimum?
In the world of espionage and terrorist activity we can now see a mechanism that can be
used to counter terrorism. In cases where military teams or investigation teams have
suspicions or indeed receive intelligence regarding certain groups the SNA inclusive of
the networks to map will form a basis of knowledge to act upon. This will allow for the
identification of key personnel and target opportunities to prevent the transfer of
knowledge with the terrorist group. Taking figure 4 into consideration, hypothetically
speaking if the CIA used the SNA appropriately (as it is widely believed that the CIA had
ground intelligence on all of the hijackers) it’s quite possible that if this knowledge was
managed correctly the CIA could have potentially used the “six degrees of separation”
theory to remove Mohamed Atta from the network. Because he had the highest degree of
centrality, closeness and in-betweeness, this could have potentially prevented the attack
from taking place.
Let’s assume the 9/11 attack did not take place, Figure 4 and figure 6 below could be
leveraged to provide a graphical illustration of the current communication and knowledge
transfer between the terrorist group members. Where new members have been identified
as part of the terrorist network each can be added as a node to the network ultimately
bringing the geography of the terrorist group to life. By managing this knowledge base
this in itself becomes a real asset in counter intelligence. The same method could be
applied to all online communities.
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Figure 4 Krebs (2002) 9/11 SNA model
3.5.5 CLUSTERING CO-EFFICIENT
To understand that how the network is likely to behave, it is necessary to segregate nodes
into cliques. It can be a very important aspect of social structure. A clique is simply a subgraph in which all nodes are more closely tied to each other than they are to nodes who are
not part of the graph, similarly it can depict the closeness of groups within social
networks. The clustering coefficient of a node i, denoted by c (i), is defined as the number
of directed links that exist between the node’s neighbours, divided by the number of
possible directed links that could exist between the node’s neighbours. Thus, if a node i’s
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neighbours have n directed links between them, then the clustering coefficient of I is
defined as
()

(

)

The clustering coefficient of a graph is the average clustering coefficient of all its nodes,
and can be denoted as follows C (G) or
C (G) = Ev∈V
|v |

( )

Thus, the clustering coefficient of a graph ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values
representing a higher degree of “cliquishness” between the nodes. In particular, a graph
with clustering coefficient of 0 contains no “triangles” of connected nodes, whereas a
graph with clustering coefficient of 1 is a perfect clique. Aggarwal (2011) refers to the
probability that the two related nodes are associated with each other, or the level to which
nodes are "friends" to each other. This coefficient illustrates the strength of connection in
the network neighbourhood of the observed node. It is calculated as the ratio of the
number of connections between the neighbours of the observed node and potential
connections unestablished by its neighbours. Watts and Strogatz (1998) found that high
clustering and short characteristic chain length are the distinctive properties of many
small-world networks. They defined a “clustering coefficient” (C) to represent the amount
of clustering. Wang (2012) states: the clustered is the important features of social systems
and economic systems. In his securities network stocks or bonds have links connected
with other nodes

(i.e. other stocks and bonds). If the nearest neighbor of the initial node

(stock or bond) is part of the entire group then there is links among them to calculate a
cluster coefficient. Bai et al (2011) puts forward a community identification method based
on clustering coefficient, which identifies the hidden community structure in the network,
but also can reasonably process boundary nodes that simultaneously belong to several
communities. Interestingly the cluster co efficient would appear to be an ideal technique
in uncovering hidden dark networks as described by Raab and Milward (2003). The goal
of his paper is to identify actors and organisations that operate in a two dimensional
environment consisting of illegal and legal activities. They further the hypothesis by
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stating “that there maybe connections between the illegal networks, dark networks in our
terms and the legal networks striving to destroy them. In a world of illegal activity a CIA
agent who penetrates a terrorist network is called a double agent.” Figure 5 below
illustrates reciprocal relationships between amongst illegal network linked to legal
organisations trying to control or curtain the illegal activity. According to Raab and
Milward (2003) it also captures the possibility of interpretation between illegal and legal
networks. Forgetting the requirement to be functionally non-judgmental in the social
sciences, the actors and organisations that cooperate in the problem space are called dark
networks, in that their activities are both covert and illegal. Figure 5 illustrates makes full
use of the clustering coefficient by providing a visualisation of the cliques with the
network.

Figure 5 Raab and Milward (2003) Reciprocal relationships between amongst illegal
network linked to legal organisations
Krebs (2002) denotes: for a small network of less than 20 nodes, we see a long average
path length of 4.75 steps. Several of the hijackers are separated by more than 6 steps.
From this metric and from Bin Laden's comments above we see that covert networks trade
efficiency for secrecy. This detection method can be used to discover hidden secret
networks within online financial communities. A hidden network could be a network
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whose sole objective is to prevent liquidity for particular stocks on the market to aid a
geopolitical terrorist or warfare events.

Clustering Coefficient

Average Path Length

Contacts

0.41

4.75

Contacts + Shortcuts

0.42

2.79

Table 2: Small-World Network Metrics
There is a constant dynamic between keeping the network hidden and actively using it to
accomplish objectives (Baker and Faulkner, 1993) to this end Krebs (2002) identifies that
six shortcuts were added to the network temporarily in order to collaborate and coordinate.
These shortcuts reduced the average path length in the network by over 40% thus
improving the information flow in the network as illustrated in table 2. When the network
is brought closer together by these shortcuts, all of the pilots ended up in a small clique the
perfect structure to efficiently coordinate tasks and activities. Figure 6 illustrates the pilot
network. The gold bars indicate the clustering co-efficient, the coming together of the pilot
“clique” in the network.
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Figure 6 9/11 Pilot clique identification

29

3.5.6 BEWTEENNESS
Narayanan (2005) defines Betweenness in his thesis.

He defines the following

“Betweenness is a centrality measure of a vertex within a graph Vertices that occur on
many shortest paths between other vertices have higher between’s than those that do not”
We are concerned with a measure called betweenness centrality. The vertex betweenness
centrality BC(v) of a vertex v ∈ V is the sum over all pairs of vertices u, w ∈ V , of the
fraction of shortest paths between u and w that pass through v:

Where σuw(v) denotes the total number of shortest path between u and w that pass
through vertex v and σuw denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w.

Where σuw(e) denotes the total number of shortest path between u and w that pass
through edge e and σuw denotes the total number of shortest paths between u and w.
In reference to Kinsella (2011) he focuses on the illicit arms trade and draws on a database
named the “Illicit Arms Transfer Database”, which systematises information contained in
journalistic reports on illicit small arms transfers. The purpose of which is to reveal high
profile positions occupied by former Soviet bloc countries in the illicit arms trade
network. He examines the Betweenness centrality calculations for Liberia‘s Illicit Arms
Trade using UN reports documenting arms embargo violations. Individuals and
transactions involved in four arms transfers from 1992 to 2002 are collated and examined.
The SNA network contains 38 people that include arms brokers, arms transportation
vendors, arms purchasers including Liberian president Charles Taylor and his son
Chuckie. The Inbetweenness network illustrated in figure 7 below clearly shows Viktor
Bout, the high-profile Russian, arms broker and transporter now in U.S. prison for arms
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trafficking as the actor with the highest Betweenness centrality score. He states that
“Brokers” or “transport agents” have a highest level of Betweenness centrality.
Furthermore he elaborates on that by stating “A closely related SNA concept useful for the
study of illicit arms trade networks is brokerage. Brokers, in network analytic terms, are
nodes positioned on directional path network. Analysts have gone on to specify particular
brokerage roles based on the actors ‘membership in groups or other attribute categories.
For instance, a node occupies a coordinator role when it is interposed between nodes
within its same group or organization; when the three nodes are members of different
groups, the broker acts as a liaison .Other brokerage roles are defined when the broker
and one actor are members of one group and the other actor is a member of a second
group: brokers that mediate inflows into their group are gatekeepers; those that mediate
outflows from their own group are representatives. Identifying important brokers in a
social network involves counting the number of triads in which that node is positioned as
an intermediary between nonadjacent nodes. Naturally, they tend to have high
betweenness scores.

Figure 7 Liberia’s Illicit Arms Trade betweeness centrality Kinsella (2011)
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Inserting a concealed financial broker into an online financial community now becomes a
interesting prospect. The impact of which may potentially cause a ripple effect in terms of
stock price movement from brokered online chat or communication.
Looking at figure 8 and the results in table 3 calculated by Krebs (2002) in terms of
betweeeness, it came as no great shock that once the degrees, betweenness and closeness
were calculated Mohamed Atta was identified as the leader. Looking at the analysis
written by Thomas A. Stewart in his article “The Six Degrees of Mohamed Atta” he states
“According to three measures. One is "degrees," or activity, which measures the number
of times someone contacts others in the network. A second is "betweenness." For example,
there appears to have been no direct link between Abdulaziz Alomari and Ziad Jarrah;
Atta and Marwan , Al-Shehhi stood between them. The more often someone is in that
"between" position, the more control he exercises in the network. The third attribute is
"closeness," which measures the extent to which a person has direct contact with others,
with no go between, this is another clue to how important an individual is to a network.
3.5.7 CLOSENESS
Closeness is preferred in network analysis to mean shortest-path length, as it gives higher
values to more central vertices, and so is usually positively associated with other measures
such as degree. In the network theory, closeness is a sophisticated measure of centrality. It
is defined as the mean geodesic distance (i.e., the shortest path) between a vertex v and all
other vertices reachable from it:
Morris T (2012) defines “Closeness is a measure to understand where individual nodes lie
between other nodes in the network. Closeness reflects another way of understanding the
relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text and over time.
Examining the closeness between nodes takes into account the connectivity of the node's
neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the shortest paths to other nodes
in the network”
The closeness metric does not feature in any of the experiments.
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Figure 8 Detailed 9/11 Hijacker network (Krebs 2002)
Table 3 shows the Betweeness and Closeness SNA calculations below.
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Degrees
* possible false ID

Betweenness

Closeness

0.361

Mohamed Atta

0.588

Mohamed
Atta

0.587

Mohamed
Atta

0.295

Marwan Al-Shehhi

0.252

Essid Sami
Ben Khemais

0.466

Marwan AlShehhi

0.213

Hani Hanjour

0.232

Zacarias
Moussaoui

0.445

Hani Hanjour

0.180

Essid Sami Ben
Khemais

0.154

Nawaf
Alhazmi

0.442

Nawaf
Alhazmi

0.180

Nawaf Alhazmi

0.126

Hani Hanjour

0.436

Ramzi Bin alShibh

0.164

Ramzi Bin al-Shibh

0.105

Djamal
Beghal

0.436

Zacarias
Moussaoui

0.164

Ziad Jarrah

0.088

Marwan AlShehhi

0.433

Essid Sami
Ben Khemais

0.148

Abdul Aziz Al-Omari*

0.050

Satam
Suqami

0.424

Abdul Aziz
Al-Omari*

0.131

Djamal Beghal

0.048

Ramzi Bin alShibh

0.424

Ziad Jarrah

0.131

Fayez Ahmed

0.043

Abu Qatada

0.409

Imad Eddin
Barakat
Yarkas

0.131

Salem Alhazmi*

0.034

Tarek
Maaroufi

0.409

Satam
Suqami

0.131

Satam Suqami

0.033

Mamoun
Darkazanli

0.407

Fayez Ahmed

0.131

Zacarias Moussaoui

0.029

Imad Eddin
Barakat
Yarkas

0.404

Lotfi Raissi

0.115

Hamza Alghamdi

0.026

Fayez Ahmed

0.401

Wail Alshehri

0.115

Said Bahaji

0.023

Abdul Aziz

0.399

Ahmed Al

34

Al-Omari*

Haznawi

0.098

Khalid Al-Mihdhar

0.022

Hamza
Alghamdi

0.399

Said Bahaji

0.098

Saeed Alghamdi*

0.017

Ziad Jarrah

0.391

Agus
Budiman

0.098

Tarek Maaroufi

0.015

Ahmed Al
Haznawi

0.391

Zakariya
Essabar

0.098

Wail Alshehri

0.013

Salem
Alhazmi*

0.389

Mamoun
Darkazanli

0.098

Wail Alshehri

0.013

Salem
Alhazmi*

0.389

Mamoun
Darkazanli

0.098

Waleed Alshehri

0.012

Lotfi Raissi

0.389

Mounir El
Motassadeq

0.082

Abu Qatada

0.012

Saeed
Alghamdi*

0.389

Mustafa
Ahmed alHisawi

0.082

Agus Budiman

0.011

Agus
Budiman

0.372

Abdelghani
Mzoudi

0.082

Ahmed Alghamdi

0.007

Ahmed
Alghamdi

0.372

Ahmed Khalil
Al-Ani

0.082

Lotfi Raissi

0.007

Ahmed
Ressam

0.365

Salem
Alhazmi*

0.082

Zakariya Essabar

0.007

Haydar Abu
Doha

0.361

Hamza
Alghamdi

0.066

Ahmed Al Haznawi

0.006

Kamel
Daoudi

0.343

Abu Qatada

0.066

Imad Eddin Barakat
Yarkas

0.006

Khalid AlMihdhar

0.343

Tarek
Maaroufi

0.066

Jerome Courtaillier

0.004

Mohamed
Bensakhria

0.339

Ahmed
Alghamdi

0.066

Kamel Daoudi

0.003

Nabil alMarabh

0.335

Waleed
Alshehri
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0.066

Majed Moqed

0.002

Jerome
Courtaillier

0.332

Djamal
Beghal

0.066

Mamoun Darkazanli

0.002

Mustafa
Ahmed alHisawi

0.332

Khalid AlMihdhar

0.066

Mohamed Bensakhria

0.002

Said Bahaji

0.332

Saeed
Alghamdi*

0.066

Mounir El Motassadeq

0.002

Wail Alshehri

0.328

Majed Moqed

0.066

Mustafa Ahmed alHisawi

0.001

Abu Walid

0.324

Ahmed
Ressam

0.066

Nabil al-Marabh

0.001

Mehdi
Khammoun

0.323

Ahmed
Alnami

0.066

Rayed Mohammed
Abdullah

0.001

Mohand
Alshehri*

0.323

Nabil alMarabh

0.049

Abdussattar Shaikh

0.001

Raed Hijazi

0.321

Haydar Abu
Doha

0.049

Abu Walid

0.001

Rayed
Mohammed
Abdullah

0.319

Mohamed
Bensakhria

0.049

Ahmed Alnami

0.001

Waleed
Alshehri

0.316

Essoussi
Laaroussi

0.049

Haydar Abu Doha

0.000

Abdelghani
Mzoudi

0.316

Jerome
Courtaillier

0.049

Mehdi Khammoun

0.000

Abdussattar
Shaikh

0.316

Kamel
Daoudi

0.049

Osama Awadallah

0.000

Abu Zubeida

0.316

Seifallah ben
Hassine

0.049

Raed Hijazi

0.000

Ahmed
Alnami

0.314

Rayed
Mohammed
Abdullah

0.033

Ahmed Ressam

0.000

Ahmed Khalil
Al-Ani

0.313

Raed Hijazi
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0.033

Bandar Alhazmi

0.000

Bandar
Alhazmi

0.311

Abdussattar
Shaikh

0.033

David Courtaillier

0.000

David
Courtaillier

0.311

Bandar
Alhazmi

0.033

Essoussi Laaroussi

0.000

Essoussi
Laaroussi

0.311

Faisal Al
Salmi

0.033

Faisal Al Salmi

0.000

Faisal Al
Salmi

0.311

Mohand
Alshehri*

0.033

Lased Ben Heni

0.000

Faisal Al
Salmi

0.311

Osama
Awadallah

0.033

Mohammed Belfas

0.000

Jean-Marc
Grandvisir

0.308

Mehdi
Khammoun

0.033

Mohand Alshehri*

0.000

Lased Ben
Heni

0.308

Mohamed
Abdi

0.033

Seifallah ben Hassine

0.000

Madjid
Sahoune

0.307

David
Courtaillier

0.016

Abdelghani Mzoudi

0.000

Majed Moqed

0.307

Mohammed
Belfas

0.016

Abu Zubeida

0.000

Mamduh
Mahmud
Salim

0.305

Lased Ben
Heni

0.016

Ahmed Khalil Al-Ani

0.000

Mohamed
Abdi

0.303

Fahid al
Shakri

0.016

Fahid al Shakri

0.000

Mohammed
Belfas

0.303

Madjid
Sahoune

0.016

Jean-Marc Grandvisir

0.000

Mounir El
Motassadeq

0.303

Samir Kishk

0.016

Madjid Sahoune

0.000

Nizar Trabelsi

0.281

Mamduh
Mahmud
Salim

0.016

Mamduh Mahmud Salim

0.000

Osama
Awadallah

0.264

Abu Walid
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0.016

Mohamed Abdi

0.000

Samir Kishk

0.250

Abu Zubeida

0.016

Nizar Trabelsi

0.000

Seifallah ben
Hassine

0.250

Jean-Marc
Grandvisir

0.016

Samir Kishk

0.000

Zakariya
Essabar

0.250

Nizar Trabelsi

0.081

Average

0.032

Average

0.052

Average

0.289

Centralization

0.565

Centralization

0.482

Centralization

Table 3: 9/11 Hijacker Betweenness and closeness
3.5.8

MODULARITY

The modularity measurement is basically calculating the number of edges within the
communities minus the expected number of such edges Modularity is defined on a
partition of the nodes in a graph. Let
be an undirected graph modeling a social
network with n nodes and m edges. Assume that each node belongs to community cv.
We define the indicator function

if and only if

same community, and otherwise
for
modularity ‘of this specific community partition is

Where is the adjacency matrix of with
and dv are degrees of u and v respectively.

if

two

, i.e.,
nodes

are in the
.

The

and 0 otherwise, du

According to Newman (2006) many networks of interest in the sciences, including a
variety of social and biological networks, are found to divide naturally into communities
or modules. The problem of detecting and characterising this community structure has
attracted considerable recent attention. One such metric is the modularity measure
proposed by Newman. Modularity is then a measure of the fraction of intra-community
edges minus the expected value of the same quantity in a network with the same
community divisions, but with edges placed without regard for communities. Mislove
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(2009) defines the following: “Modularity therefore ranges from -1 to 1, with 0
representing no more community structure than would be expected in a random graph,
and significantly positive values representing the presence of community structure. In
practice, modularity over 0.3 or higher is observed in real-world networks with significant
community structure”. Merely the finding that a network contains tightly-knit groups at all
can convey useful information: a network contains tightly-knit groups at all can convey
useful information: One of the objectives Weinstein et al (2009) aimed to achieve was to
employ social network analysis (SNA) algorithms as a filtering step to divide the Jihad
group Jemaah Islamiyah into distinct communities from the September 2004 bombing of
the Australian embassy in Jakarta atrocity. They used the Newman modularity community
detection SNA algorithms. The experiment used community detection on the simulated
graph, detected communities were searched and the community with the highest number
of terror cell actors, who, for the purposes of this experiment, were known in advance.
This detected a number of terrorist clutter actors in a particular community. Each clutter
actor represents a false alarm, and each terrorist actor represents a positive detection.
Given those counts, this allowed to precision calculations and recall measures on the
detected community Results also indicated that for smaller graphs the community
detection performs quite well with high precision scores. However, as the graph gets
larger, precision scores begin to drop dramatically. However when examining
communities in networks, one often requires an objective metric to evaluate how “good” a
particular division of the network into communities is.
3.5.9 DIAMETER AND RADIUS
Mislove (2009) states in his thesis, the radius and diameter of a graph, which represents
how far away nodes, are from each other in the network. First, the eccentricity of a node v
is the maximal shortest path distance between v and any other node. The radius of a graph
is then the minimum eccentricity across all vertices, and the diameter is the maximum
eccentricity across all vertices. Thus, the radius represents the maximal distance from the
most “central” node in the graph to all other nodes, and the diameter represents the
maximal distance from the least “central” node in the graph to all other nodes. Due to the
computational complexity associated with determining the actual radius and diameter, the
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radius and diameter of a graph is often estimated by calculating the eccentricity of a large
random sample of nodes in the network. In such cases, the diameter should be viewed as a
lower bound of the true diameter, and the radius as an upper bound of the true radius.
3.6

CONCLUSION

SNA metrics provide a useful insight into how networks evolve, who the main influencers
are as it focuses on interaction rather than behaviour. The literature identifies an array of
disciplines the methodology can be applied too. Whilst It is helpful to understand how an
online financial community and terrorist community network evolve and be able illustrate
how it can be destabilised using the six degrees of separation theory. It maybe more
helpful, however, to understand how a network conscripts participants and why people
wish to join terrorist or online financial community’s networks.
From the literature review the main limitation of social network analysis is the same that
applies to any new and innovative technology: social network analysis is just one tool that
can be used to understand networks and communities, and is just one piece of the jigsaw.
Text mining is another tool that can be used in conjunction with same It is true to state
that networks be that online financial networks or

terrorist groups, share striking

similarities in regards to centrality inbetweenness and modularity. Despite their nonhierarchical approach, most networks are not completely organised in a network structure.
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CHAPTER 4
4

EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY: STATISTICAL TEST AND DATA

MINING MODELS

The literature review considered the SNA metrics existing techniques and research used
within the field. Chapter 4 will portray the data mining and prediction techniques used to
formalise the approach taken. These methods were used to perform the basic operations of
data mining such as predictive analysis and descriptive analysis. The predictive analysis
involves looking at the past history with the intent to predict future behavior. Description
analysis looks at deviation and similarity based analysis. The process used for the data
extraction follows the basics Knowledge Discovery in databases (KDD) which is
concerned with finding useful information and patterns in databases and the use of
algorithms is used via the Weka application to extract patterns derived from the KDD
process.
4.1

GINI INDEX

The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of a distribution, and in this thesis is
applied to the distribution of messages posted by users. It is defined as a ratio with values
between 0 and 1: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz curve of the distribution
and the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the area under the uniform
distribution line. It was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini and published in
his 1912 paper "Variabilità e mutabilità" ("Variability and Mutability").
The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed as a percentage, and is equal to the Gini
coefficient multiplied by 100. (The Gini coefficient is equal to half of the relative mean
difference.)

The Gini coefficient can also be used to measure wealth equality and

inequality. This use requires that no one has a negative net wealth. It is also commonly
used for the measurement of discriminatory power of rating systems in the credit risk
management. The Gini coefficient is defined as a ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve
diagram. The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution
function. If the area between the line of perfect equality and Lorenz curve is A, and the
area under the Lorenz curve is B, then the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B).
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If the Lorenz curve is represented by the function Y = L(X), the value of B can be found
with integration and
∫ ( )

4.2

PAIRED TEST

A paired t-test compares two samples in cases where each value in one sample has a
natural partner in the other. A paired t-test looks at the difference between paired values (
the mean values) in two samples, takes into account the variation ( Standard deviation) of
values within each sample, and produces a single number known as a t-value. Considering
that the experiments are taking pre and post data sets before geopolitical events the pair
test will outline the longitudinal differences between both sets of data. The paired test
formula is as follows:

̅̅̅

̅̅̅

√
Where ̅̅̅ is the mean of the first dataset, ̅̅̅ is the mean of the second dataset,
standard deviation of the first dataset,
and

is the

is the standard deviation of the second dataset

is the size of the dataset. In our experiments we will have n=154 elements (i.e.22

geopolitical events multiplied by 7 stocks = 154 elements). In order to understand the tvalue corresponding to a certain confidence level the student’s t-value distribution (see
Table 4) is used. For a 90% confidence rating, referring the table 4, a t-value of 1.301 is
required when N > 45, while a t-value of 1.679 is needed for a confidence level of 0.95%
and 2.41 for a 0.99% confidence level. The computation of the paired testes will be
calculated using Network X.
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Table 4: T – Value confidence rating table
4.3

DECISION TREES USED FOR PREDICTION MODELS

Sas (2012) states that Decision trees are a simple, but a powerful form of multiple variable
analyses. They provide unique capabilities to supplement, complement, and substitute for
a variety of data mining tools and techniques and statistical intelligence. Decision trees are
produced by algorithms that identify various ways of splitting a data set into branch-like
segments. These segments form an inverted decision tree that originates with a root node
at the top of the tree. The object of analysis is reflected in this root node as a simple, onedimensional display in the decision tree interface. The name of the field of data that is the
object of analysis is usually displayed, along with the spread or distribution of the values
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that are contained in that field. The display of this node reflects all the data set records,
fields, and field values that are found in the object of analysis. The discovery of the
decision rule to form the branches or segments underneath the root node is based on a
method that extracts the relationship between the object of analysis (that serves as the
target field in the data) and one or more fields that serve as input fields to create the
branches or segments. The values in the input field are used to estimate the likely value in
the target field. The target field is also called an outcome, response, or dependent field or
variable. To create a decision tree a list of variables for input is needed this is located in
appendix B. The experiment will use the open source platform Weka using the J48
algorithm.
4.4

THE CONFUSION MATRIX

A confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost, 1998) contains information about actual and
predicted classifications done by a classification system. Performance of such systems is
commonly evaluated using the data in the matrix. The following table shows the confusion
matrix for a two class classifier.

Table 5: The Confusion Matrix
Based on the data contained in the confusion matrix, several performance indicators can
be defined. The most common performance indicators used are precision, recall and the Fmeasure, defined as follows:

Recall =
Precision =
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F = 2.
In order to explain the meaning of these three metrics, we refer to how they are used in the
field of information retrieval. If we have a set of records in a database and a set of records
to be retrieved by a search engine, in most of the cases the set returned by the search
engine may not fully match the set of relevant records.
Recall in information retrieval is the fraction of the documents that are relevant to the
query that are successfully retrieved. That means that we have maximum recall if all the
relevant documents were retrieved. However, even non-relevant documents might have
been retrieved. In order to test the quality of the retrieval, the precision is also needed.
Precision is the fraction of retrieved documents that are relevant to the find that means that
in order to have high precision, if 10 documents are retrieved, all of the 10 are relevant
(but the recall could be low, meaning that there were more than 10 relevant documents).
The F measures accuracy mixing the statistics precision p and recall r. Precision is the
ratio of true positives (tp) to all predicted positives (tp + fp). Recall is the ratio of true
positives to all actual positives (tp + fn). Thence the F score is

F = 2.
4.5

PYTHON

where

p=

P ARSER

A Python parser is used to get a list of messages from the online financial communities
within Yahoo Finance. This is used to create the networks and compute the SNA metrics
of the associated actors from each stock forum on Yahoo Finance. A Python library
known as Network X is used in the computation.
4.6

WEKA

Weka is open source software that was used for the predictive modeling in this thesis.
Weka uses a collection of machine learning algorithms for data mining and data
prediction. The algorithms can either be applied directly to a dataset or called from your
own Java code. The application requires a preformatted file pertaining to the experimental
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data for input into the application. Weka contains tools for data pre-processing,
classification, regression, clustering, association rules, and visualisation. Appendix A
contains the file used for the experiments.
4.7

GEPHI

Visualisation plays an important role in SNA, for illustration and exploration purposes
alone, the visualisation of SNA content allows the examiners to analyse and manipulate
the network in the most effective manor and means. Gephi is open source software for
graph and network analysis. It uses a 3D render engine to display large networks in realtime and to speed up the exploration. A flexible multi task architecture brings new
possibilities to work with, complex data sets and produce valuable visual results Bastian
(2009) Pajek is another open software application, however it’s widely believed that the
Gephi application is a more powerful application. Typically results are displayed in
graphic format with graphs that consist of nodes to represent actors and lines on the
network. The Gephi application was used to create the network diagrams on this thesis.
4.8

NETWORKX

NetworkX is a python language software package for the creation, manipulation, and
study of the structure, dynamics, and functions of complex networks. With NetworkX you
can load and store networks in standard and nonstandard data formats, generate many
types of random and classic networks, analyse network structure, build network models,
design new network algorithms, draw networks, and much more ( NetworkX)
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CHAPTER 5
5

EXPERIMENT INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a set of experiments performed to test the reaction of online
communities and the stock market to geopolitical events related to conflicts and
international crisis.
Three experiments were undertaken. The first experiment tests how online communities of
investors talking about stocks operating in the military sector change before and after a
geopolitical event. In order to do so, a build of online investors’ networks is required and
the metrics of different networks such as density, modularity and centralisation will be
compared by mean of a statistical test.
The second experiment is concerned with the examination of how prices of military
related stocks change in reaction to geopolitical events. In particular, we compare the price
of these stocks before and after the event in order to understand if stock prices are
sensitive to such events, and we also compare the price change with the S&P 500 index to
understand the behavior of such stocks relatively to the market benchmark.
Finally, in the last experiment a decision tree predictive model is used to investigate if the
prices of military stocks a week after a geopolitical event could be predicted by using a set
of features encompassing the past prices of each stock and a set of SNA metrics gathered
from online community’s activity relevant to each stock.
5.1

DATASET

This section describes the dataset collected and used in the three experiments of this
chapter. The naming convention and notation are also introduced.
5.1.1 MILITARY STOCKS
The inception point was to select a number of stocks operating in the defense and military
sector. These are mainly medium and big capitalisation manufacturing companies with a
strong R&D department.
We call

the set of stocks identified.

contains 7 US military stocks, each of them

identified by its market ticker. For instance, we use the symbol

to refer to the stock
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United Technologies. The stocks are listed in table 6. The column capitalisation contains
the capitalisation of each stock in billions of dollars, while the percentage in parenthesis is
the relative size of each stock over the total capitalisation of all the seven stocks. The
seven military stocks have a total capitalisation of about $300 billion, which represents
about 2% of the total capitalisation of the S&P 500 index, estimated at about $15 trillion
in July 2014.
Stock

Ticker Capitalisation Description

Honeywell
International

HOC

United
Technologies

UTX

74.7B $
(24.84%)

100.34B $
(33.37%)

Honeywell International Inc. operates as a
diversified technology and manufacturing
company worldwide. Its Aerospace segment
provides turbine
propulsion
engines,
auxiliary power units, environmental control
and electric power systems, engine controls,
flight safety, communications, navigation,
radar and surveillance systems, and aircraft
lighting products for aircraft manufacturers,
airlines, business and general aviation,
military, space, and airport operations, as
well as offers management and technical,
logistics, aircraft wheels and brakes, and
repair and overhaul services
United Technologies Corporation provides
technology products and services to the
building systems and aerospace industries
worldwide. It also offers electronic security
products, including intruder alarms, access
control systems, and video surveillance
systems; and monitoring, response, and
security personnel services.. Its Pratt &
Whitney segment supplies aircraft engines
for commercial, military, business jet, and
general aviation markets, as well as provides
fleet management services for commercial
engines. The company’s UTC Aerospace
Systems
segment supplies
aerospace
products. Its Sikorsky segment manufactures
military and commercial helicopters, as well
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as provides aftermarket
aircraft parts and services.
L-3
LLL
Communication
Holding

9.42B $

Lockheed
Martin
Corporation

LMT

55.7B $

Alliant

ATK

(3.14%)

(18.51%)

4.1B $

helicopter

and

L-3 Communications Corporation, provides
command,
control,
communications,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C3ISR) systems; aircraft modernisation and
maintenance; and national security solutions
in the United States and internationally. The
company operates in four segments:
Aerospace Systems, Electronic Systems,
Communication Systems, and National
Security Solutions. It offers a range of
products and services, including components,
products, subsystems, and systems, as well as
related services to military and commercial
customers in various business areas.
Lockheed Martin Corporation, a security and
aerospace company, is engaged in the
research, design, development, manufacture,
integration, and sustainment of advanced
technology systems, products, and services
for defense, civil, and commercial
applications
in
United
States
and
internationally. The company operates in five
segments: Aeronautics, Information Systems
& Global Solutions, Missiles and Fire
Control, Mission Systems and Training, and
Space Systems. The Aeronautics segment
offers military aircrafts, such as combat and
air mobility aircrafts, unmanned air vehicles,
and related technologies. The Missiles and
Fire Control segment offers air and missile
defense systems; tactical missiles and air-toground precision strike weapon systems;
logistics and other technical services; fire
control systems; and manned and unmanned
ground vehicles.
Alliant Techsystems Inc. develops and
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Technologies

Northrop
Grumman
Corporation

NOC

(1.4%)

produces aerospace, defense, and commercial
products to the U.S. government, allied
nations, and prime contractors in the United
States, and internationally. It supplies
ammunition,
firearms,
and
shooting
accessories. The Aerospace Group segment
offers rocket motor systems for human and
cargo launch vehicles, conventional and
strategic
missiles,
missile
defense
interceptors, small and micro-satellites,
satellite
components,
structures
and
subsystems, lightweight space deployables,
solar arrays, decoy and illuminating flares,
and aircraft countermeasures. The Defense
Group segment provides military small,
medium, and large caliber ammunition;
propulsion systems for tactical missiles and
missile defense applications; strike weapons;
precision munitions; gun systems; aircraft
survivability systems; fuses and warheads;
energetic materials; and special mission
aircraft.

26.5B $

Northrop Grumman Corporation provides
systems, products, and solutions in
aerospace, electronics, information systems,
and technical service areas to government
and commercial customers worldwide. The
company’s Aerospace Systems segment
designs, develops, integrates, and produces
manned aircraft, unmanned systems,
spacecraft, high-energy laser systems,
microelectronics, and other systems and
subsystems. This segment sells its products
primarily to government agencies for use in
various mission areas. Its Electronic Systems
segment offers solutions for sensing,
understanding, anticipating, and controlling
operating environment to military, civil, and
commercial customers. This segment’s
solutions comprise defense electronics and

(8.81%)
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systems, airborne fire control radars,
situational awareness systems, early warning
systems, airspace management systems,
navigation
systems,
communications
systems, marine power and propulsion
systems, space systems, and logistics
services.
Raytheon Co.

RTN

30.1B $
(10.1%)

Raytheon Company develops integrated
products, services, and solutions in the areas
of sensing; effects; command, control,
communications, and intelligence; mission
support; and cyber and information security
worldwide. It operates in four segments:
Integrated Defense Systems; Intelligence,
Information, and Services; Missile Systems;
and Space and Airborne Systems. The
Integrated Defense Systems segment
provides integrated air and missile defense;
radar solutions; naval combat and ship
electronic systems; command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence
solutions; and air traffic management
systems. The Intelligence, Information, and
Services segment offers a range of technical
and professional services, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation,
DoD space and weather solutions,
cybersecurity, analytics, training, logistics,
mission support. The Missile Systems
segment develops and supports a range of
weapon systems, including missiles, smart
munitions, close-in weapon systems,
projectiles, kinetic kill vehicles and combat
sensor solutions.

Table 6: List of military stocks
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5.1.2 GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS
A number of geopolitical events were collected related to global conflicts, war or political
instability of recent years. We call the set of events , and a specific event ∈ . Each
event is represented by a date, the conflict it belongs to and the text of the news associated
with the event. News is supposed to be market-sensitive, especially for military stocks,
and supposed to trigger a reaction on the online communities of investors. There was a
large amount of geopolitical events gathering pertaining to 10 conflicts. The data set was
condensed down to 22 geo-political events from three recent conflicts: the Libyan
rebellion during the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war and the Ukraine crisis. The time
interval of the events goes from the beginning of 2011 to April 2014. The British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News was used as the source for collecting the data.
ID
Date
1

2

3

4

Conflict Event News
Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi Arrest of
16/02/2011 Libya human rights activist triggers demonstrations in Libya's
second largest city
NATO to take control in Libya after US, UK and France
reach agreement Britain, France and the US have agreed that
NATO will take over the military command of the no-fly
22/02/2011 Libya
zone over Libya in a move that represents a setback for
Nicolas Sarkozy, who had hoped to diminish the role of the
alliance.
Libyan plane and tanks destroyed by allied jets French
fighter jets have destroyed a Libyan plane in the coastal city
24/03/2011 Libya of Misrata in the first enforcement of the no-fly zone
imposed by the UN to try to halt Muammar Gaddafi's antirebel offensive.
21/04/2011

Libya

Drones can be used by NATO forces in Libya, says Obama
War crimes court issues Gaddafi arrest warrant ICC orders
Libyan leader and his son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to stand trial
on charges of torturing and killing civilians and rebels

5

27/06/2011

Libya

6

30/06/2011

Libya

7

29/06/2011

Libya

Boeing projects $300M overrun on tanker project.
France admits arming rebels. NATO is reviewing the
conduct of its military campaign in Libya after France
admitted arming rebel fighters in apparent defiance of the
UN mandate.
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8

03/03/2014

Ukraine

9

07/03/2014

Ukraine

10 11/03/2014

11 13/03/2014

12 30/04/2014

Russia's parliament approves Vladimir Putin's request to use
force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests. Pro-Russian
rallies are held in several Ukrainian cities outside Crimea,
including the second-biggest city Kharkiv. Barack Obama
tells Mr Putin to pull forces back to bases.
Ukraine's interim PM Yatsenyuk says Russia has effectively
declared war. US says Russia is in control of Crimea.
"Black Monday" on Russian stock markets as reports
suggests Russia's military had issued a deadline for
Ukrainian forces in Crimea to surrender. The reports are
later denied. Russia's UN envoy says toppled President
Yanukovych had asked the Russian president in writing for
use of force.
7/8/9/10th March 2014: Russia says it will support Crimea if
the region votes to leave Ukraine. Russia's state gas
company Gazprom warns Kiev that its gas supply might be
cut off. The US and France warn of "new measures" against
Russia if it does not withdraw its forces from Ukraine.
Warning shots are fired at international monitors trying to
enter Crimea. Armed men seize a military hospital in
Simferopol.

Ukraine

The European Commission offers Ukraine trade incentives
worth nearly 500m euros ($694m; £417m). Ukrainian MPs
ask the US and UK to use all measures, including military, to
stop Russia's aggression.

Ukraine

Barack Obama pledges to stand with Ukraine during a
meeting with interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk at
the White House.

Ukraine

Acting President Olexander Turchynov reinstates
conscription, warning Ukraine is on "full combat alert". ProRussians take over the regional prosecutor's office in eastern
Donetsk.

13 15/03/2011

Syria

14 18/03/2011

Syria

Activists call for a "Day of Rage" across Syria, inspired by
other popular uprisings across the Arab world. In February,
several youths were arrested in the southern town of Daraa
for writing graffiti calling for the downfall of the regime of
President Bashar Assad.
Activists say five people were killed as security forces
dispersed crowds in Daraa — one of several demonstrations
across the country — in the first deadly violence reported in
the uprising. Unrest spreads in coming months.

53

15 26/04/2011

Syria

16 18/05/2011

Syria

17 05/08/2011

Syria

18

6/10/2011

Syria

19 23/12/2011

Syria

20 04/02/2012

Syria

21 20/08/2012

Syria

22

3/12/2012

Syria

Thousands of soldiers backed by tanks and snipers open fire
on civilians in Daraa and two other locations, according to
witnesses. Armed security agents conduct house-to-house
sweeps. Neighborhoods are sectioned off and checkpoints
are erected. Electricity, water and cellphone services are cut.
At least 11 people are killed and 14 others lay in the streets,
either dead or gravely wounded
U.S. imposes sanctions on Assad and senior Syrian officials
for human rights abuses.
The United States, Britain, France and Germany and the
European Union demand Assad resign, saying he is unfit to
lead.
Russia and China veto a European-backed U.N. Security
Council resolution that threatens sanctions against Syria if it
doesn't immediately halt its military crackdown against
civilians.
Back-to-back car bombs near Syria's intelligence agencies in
Damascus kill at least 44 in first major attack in the heart of
the capital. Syria's state-run TV blames Al-Qaeda militants.
Russia and China veto a resolution in the U.N. Security
Council that backs an Arab League plan calling for Assad to
step down. The double-veto outrages the U.S. and European
council members who fear it will embolden Assad regime.
Obama says U.S. will reconsider its opposition to military
involvement in Syria if Assad's regime deploys or uses
chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red
line" for the United States
Speaking of chemical weapons, Obama says Assad should
know "if you make the tragic mistake of using these
weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held
accountable."

Table 7: List of military stocks
5.1.3 STOCK PRICES
Historical prices of the stocks were collected in the set

and the value of the S&P 500

index, used as the market benchmark in our experiments. Closing prices adjusted by
dividends and splits were collected via a Bloomberg terminal.
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Given a stock
stock
before)

and an event

at the date of event

, while

( ) is the price of

( ) is the closing price of stock

after (or

days from the event. For instance, referring to the event id of table 7 and the

tickers of table 6,
event

∈ , we use the following notation:

(

) is the closing price of the stock UTX five days after the

(a Libyan-related event happened on the 16th of February 2011).

The return of each stock (also called the gain of a stock) is expressed as a percentage in
[0,1] and it is denoted by . For istance,
days from the event

( )

( ) is the gain of the stock

after (or before)

. By definition it is:

( )

( )
( )

( )

( )

( )
( )

Stock prices follow a log-normal distribution, while stock returns follow a normal
distribution.
5.1.4 ONLINE COMMUNITIES DATA
Online message board data was collected about online investors’ interactions from 2010
till 2014. Our source of online communities’ data is represented by Yahoo! Finance
Message Boards.
Yahoo! Finance keeps a message board for each stock quoted on the US market. Each
message board is a stream of threads opened by registered users. Each thread is a stream
of messages posted by users. A user can decide to add a new message to a thread, answer
to a message or open a new thread.
A preexisting DIT parser using Python 2.7 programming language, the urllib library and
regular expression was used for the message board extraction from the Yahoo Finance
website. The parser collected the discussions regarding the seven military stock of interest
from 2010 till July 2014. Data was collected about the list of threads, the list of messages
for each thread, the content of each message, time of the message, users and the citations
between messages. Data collected by the parser was stored in a MySQL database. Table 8
describes in details the data collected and it is an exact mapping of the database table used.
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Field

Description

Message ID

An incremental unique ID of each message posted

Thread ID

An incremental unique Id of each Thread opened

Thread Title

The title of the thread

Message Timestamp

Timestamp when the message was posted

Message Content

The text of the message

Stock

The stock message board the message refers to (one of the
seven military stocks considered)

User

A unique username of the author of the message

Message Quoted

If the message is a response to another message, the field
contains the ID of the message quoted.

Table 8 Data collected from Yahoo! Finance Message Boards

There was approximately 85,000 messages regarding the 7 stocks examined, written in
about 9,500 threads by about 3,850 users.
5.1.5 BUILDING A NETWORK OF INVESTORS
Using the Message Board data described in Table 8, I was able to define a social network
for each stock and a specific interval of time

. The nodes of the networks were

represented by users positng a message in the interval of time, while an edge is drawn
from node

to node

if user

quoted at least one message written by user .

The notation followed is the following. We call
the stock

( ) the network of online users for

built considering all the messages posted in the interval

. Since we are

interested in the behaviour of online communities before and after a geopolitical event
the social network of investors
interval

, where

,

days before an event

will be represented by the time

is the timestamp of event

. In the same way, the network
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d days after an event
( ) and

notation

is identified by the timestamp
( ) to identify the network

. We use the shorter

days before and after an event

.

In order to describe each network , the SNA metrics described in Table 9 were
computed.
Indicator

Description

( )

Number of nodes in the networks, equal to the number of users
active on the network

( )

Number of edges of the networks, equal to the number of users
cited

( )

Density of the network

( )

Freeman’s centralization of the network

( )

Average in-betweennes centrality of the network

( )

Newmann’s modularity of the network

( )

The Gini index of the distribution of the number of messages
posted by each user in the network. Low value of the Gini index
are an indicator of messages equally spread over users and
viceversa. Note how this indicator is not strictly speaking an SNA
indicator

Diameter(N)

Diameter of the network

Table 9 SNA indicators computed for each network.
5.1.6 EXPERIMENT 1: TESTING ONLINE INVESTORS REACTION TO GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS
This experiment wants to verify if the structure of the network of online investors is
significantly modified by geopolitical events. In order to investigate the issue we defined,
for each stock

in

community activity
all the activity

and each event

a pair of networks: one including all the online

days before the event (called the before network) and one including

days after the event (called the after network). Scope of the experiment is
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to verify if there is a statistical difference between the SNA metrics of the before and after
network. Therefore, we will perform a paired t-test for each metrics.
In the experiment, we used a value of the number of days

equal to 2, 5 and 20 trading

days (equal to 2 days, one week and one month), to test the reaction of the community at
different time interval.
Since we have a dataset of 22 events, 7 stocks and three different time interval (2,5 and 20
days), we have collected a total of 462 before and 462 after networks. Figure 9 depicts one
of the most common patterns identified between before and after networks. Usually, the
after network is more centralised, with higher number of users and quotations and it is
distributed around few central actors, while the before networks appears less united with a
higher number of isolated nodes.

Before

After

Figure 9: The network of online investors talking about UTX the week before and after
Obama said U.S. will reconsider its opposition to military involvement in Syria (20th
August 2012). The graph on the right has a higher number of nodes and links, it is more
connected and the core actors of the network make it more centralised.
The following tables show the results of a paired t-test performed between the before and
after networks. We divided our results according to the size of the time interval considered
(2, 5 and 20 days).
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Indicators

Mean Difference

√

T value

Significance

( )

3.64

1.28

2.84

+++

( )

3.21

1.6

1.99

++

( )

0.014

0.023

0.74

=

( )

0.048

0.032

1.74

++

( )

0.64

0.413

1.55

+

( )

-0.164

0.104

-1.58

-

( )

-0.037

0.056

-0.66

=

( )

1.12

0.82

1.36

+

Table 10 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=2

Table 10 illustrates the results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks
with d=2 days. N= 154. The symbol +++ means statistical significance with a 0.99%
confidence level and that the values of the after network are greater than the values of the
before networks, ++ and + corresponds to a significance level of 0.95% and 0.90%
respectively. The symbol ---, -- and – denotes statistical difference at 0.99, 0.95 and 0.90
confidence level but where values of the before network are greater than ones of the after
network.
Indicators

Mean Difference

√

T value

Significance

( )

2.62

1.41

1.85

++

( )

1.72

1.83

0.93

=

( )

0.015

0.025

0.6

=

( )

0.047

0.031

1.52

+
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( )

0.625

0.452

1.38

+

( )

-0.04

0.153

-0.26

=

( )

-0.028

0.071

-0.39

=

( )

0.89

1.01

0.88

=

Table 11 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=5 days

Indicators

Mean Difference

√

T value

Significance

( )

-0.46

1.38

-0.33

=

( )

-0.86

1.94

-0.44

=

( )

0.013

0.028

0.45

=

( )

0.028

0.054

0.518

=

( )

0.34

0.493

0.689

=

( )

-0.104

0.194

-0.536

=

( )

-0.059

0.0626

-0.94

= (- with cl
80%)

( )

-0.43

0.89

-0.48

=

Table 12 Results of the paired t-test between the before and after networks with d=20
days
5.1.7 EXPERIMENT 1: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Tables 10, 11, and 12 show a clear trend. When we consider the period immediately after
a geopolitical event ( =2 days), the majority of the SNA metrics except density,
modularity and Gini index are significantly higher in the after network than in the before
network. Based on experimental results, we can conclude that during the two days
following a geopolitical event the following happens:
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More online users are talking about military stocks, as evidenced by the high
increase in the number of nodes in the after network (t-value = 2.84, 0.99
confidence level)



These users are interacting more, as evidenced by the high increase in the number
of edges in the after network (t-value=1.99). This behaviour could be interpreted
as an increased collective effort of the users to join strengths together and try to
discuss and make sense of the consequences of the recent event. Casnici et al
(2014) call this behaviour joint-attention of online investors.



The centralisation and average in-betweennes centrality of the after networks
increase significantly. This means that in the after networks there are a group of
actors with high importance in the network, acting as hubs and central point of
reference during the discussion. This could be interpreted as the presence of a
small group of authoritative users that take centre stage when there is something
potentially critical to discuss



In accordance with this, the modularisation of the network is significantly lower in
the after network. This means that the network is less segregated in subcommunities and it is more centralised into one big discussion. However, on an
absolute scale the values of modularity before and after are low (less than 0.25)
meaning that in general the networks of online investors show little segregation.



The graph density is not significantly changed, even if it is higher in the after
networks, while the Gini index of the distribution of messages per user is not
significantly different but it is lower in the after network. We remind how the Gini
index measures the inequality of a distribution, and a low Gini value is an index of
a more uniform and “democratic” distribution. Therefore, there is a tendency in
the after network to host a more democratic discussion where more users have the
possibility to interact.

When the period of observation increases, ( =5 or =20 days), this effect fades quickly. 5
days networks the number of nodes, the centralisation and in-betweennes are still
significantly higher in the after network, meaning that the discussions after an event are
61

still bigger and more centralised after 1 week. In the 20 days network there is no statistical
difference, meaning that after 1 month from the event online discussions do not differ
significantly. The highest t-value is represented by the Gini index, lower in the after
network, suggesting again how discussions after an event have a tendency to be more
democratic.
5.1.8 EXPERIMENT 2: MARKET REACTIONS TO GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS
In this experiment we test if the price of the seven military stocks after a geopolitical event
differs significantly from the price before the event. Moreover, we also compare the price
change of the military stocks with the S&P 500 index, in order to understand if the
military stock behaves in a different way than the overall market trend, and to what extent
the military stocks under-performs or outperforms the market benchmark.
We follow a similar methodology as experiment 1. We consider the price change (i.e. the
gain) of each stock 5 days and 1 day before the event and we compare it with the gain
after the event using a paired t-test. Using our notation, we check the statistical difference
between the gain
( ) and

( ) and

( ) for all the stocks

and event

; and the same for

( ). We therefore include all the stocks in the comparison without

performing different experiments for different stocks. In this way we check if the set of
military stocks are overall changing their price in reaction to geopolitical events. Table 13
shows the results of the price comparisons. Table 14 shows the same experiment with the
S&P 500 prices, to check how the S&P 500 is also reacting to geopolitical events.
In the last part of the experiment I examine if the price change of the military stocks
differs significantly from the S&P 500 price change. The comparison is valid since, even
if all the seven military stocks are part of the S&P 500 index, their total capitalisation is
about 2% of the index capitalisation, and therefore they are too small to manipulate the
price. In order to do a meaningful comparison with the S&P 500 index, we compute an
aggregated index for our seven stocks in the same way the S&P 500 is computed. In fact,
the S&P 500 is a weighted average of each stock value based on the capitalisation of each
stock. We followed the same approach. The price changes of each military stock are
weighted by the capitalisation of the stock relative to the total capitalisation of all the
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seven stocks. In table 6, the column Capitalisation reports the percentage of each stock
over the total. For instance, HON represents almost 25% of the total capitalisation of the
seven military stocks. Finally, Table 15 shows the comparison between the S&P 500
index and our military stocks index 1 and 5 days after an event.
the gain of our military stocks index after
Indicators

is used to refer to

days from the event.

Mean Difference

√

t-value

Significance

0.25%

0.002158

1.17

= (+ with cl=0.85)

1.18%

0.005196

2.27

++

Table 13 Comparisons between military stocks price before and after a geopolitical event
Indicators

Mean Difference

√

t-value

Significance

0.089%

0.003158

0.281

=

0.69%

0.0044

1.53

+

Table 14 Comparisons between S&P 500 price before and after a geopolitical event
Indicators

Mean Difference

0.042%
(avg

Significance

0.001609

0.281

=

0.00303

1.254

= (+ with
cl=0.85)

=0.075% avg
=0.033%)
0.38%

(avg

tvalue

√

=2.15%, avg
=1.77%)

Table 15 Comparisons between military stock prices v S&P 500 index prices before and
after a geopolitical event.
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5.1.9 EXPERIMENT 2: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 13 confirms that, one week after the geopolitical event, the price of military stocks
is higher than the price before the event (confidence level 0.99). However, this effect is
much smaller after one day immediately after the event, where the price is still higher but
a t-value of 1.17 guarantees statistical significance only for a confidence level of 0.85.

The though process then shifted to if this increase is specific to military stocks or it also
affects the market, represented by the S&P 500 index. Table 14 shows that actually the
entire market increased after one week from an event, even if with smaller confidence
level (confidence level=0.9, t-value=1.53), while there is no statistical difference for the
price after 1 day from the event.

Finally, given that both the market and the military stocks significantly increased their
value after an event, an examination took place to ascertain if there is a statistical
difference between the increase of the seven military stocks and the increase of S&P 500.
Table 15 shows how there is no statistical difference 1 day after the event, while there is a
low statistical difference in favour of the military stocks one week after the event
(confidence level = 0.85, t-value=1.25).
We conclude how both military stocks and the market index significantly increase one
week after geopolitical events, and there is a low tendency of military stocks to
outperform the market during that week.

5.1.10 EXPERIMENT 3: PREDICTING STOCK PRICE MOVEMENTS AFTER GEOPOLITICAL
EVENTS

In this experiment we investigate if it is possible to predict the price of a military stock
one week after a geopolitical event based on a set of features including SNA metrics,
historical prices and S&P 500 index prices.
The set of features includes the SNA metrics of the before networks at 2, 5 and 20 days,
plus the SNA metrics of network the day of the event. Regarding historical prices, we
include the price of 1 week before the event, the price of the day before the event and the
64

closing price of the day of the event. We also include the same historical prices for the
S&P 500.
Using a J48 decision tree algorithm, our goal is to predict

, i.e. the future movement of

the price of a stock after 5 days form the event. We model the prediction problem as a
binary classification problem, meaning that we aim to predict if the value of
above or below a certain threshold
actually chose the value

. Even if the most obvious choice is

will be
, we

, that means that we aim to predict if the price of the

stock will rise above 1% in the next following days. The reasons why we have set this
threshold are the following.
First, there is a reason linked to our dataset. Our dataset covers a period of time from 2011
to 2014, a period where the US stock market was mainly bullish with a steady positive
trend. In our dataset 86.4% of cases the stock price increased a week after an event.
Therefore, by using a threshold of 0 the two classes to be predicted would be too
unbalanced.
On the other side, the median value of the weekly stock price change in our dataset is
equal to 1.21%. Therefore, by setting a threshold at 1%, (quite close to the median value),
our dataset includes about 62% of positive case and 38% of negative ones.
Moreover, there is a technical trading consideration. Predicting if the price will rise or
decrease is not enough for sustaining a profitable trading strategy after commission costs
are considered. A gain of 1% is regarded as a solid psychological threshold for a
successful weekly trading strategy.
The following table describes the list of features used in our classifier. Note how features
are divided into market-based (mainly historical prices of stocks and S&P 500 index) and
SNA-based features.
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Feature

Description

In all the features, the apex
-1 and 1.

represent the time interval and it takes the values -10, -5,

( )

Number of nodes in the networks, equal to the number of
users active on the network

( )

Number of edges of the networks, equal to the number of
users cited

( )

Density of the network

( )

Freeman’s centralisation of the network

( )

Average in-betweeness centrality of the network

( )

Newmann’s modularity of the network

( )

The Gini index of the distribution of the number of
messages posted on the network. Note how this indicator
is not strictly speaking an SNA indicator

( )

Diameter of the network
Stock considered, belonging to the set {UTX, HON, NOC,
ATK, LLL, LMT, RNT}
Return of the S&P 500 index 10, 5 and 1 days before the
event and the day of the event
Return of the stock 10, 5 and 1 days before the event
and the day of the event
Binary class to be predicted

Table 16 List of Features used
Considering that each feature is considered with a time interval of 10, 5, and 1 day before
the event and 1 day after, there are 41 features and 1 predictive class to be considered. All
of them are numeric, except the feature stick that is nominal.
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The database contains 462 elements, and it has been divided into training and a testing set
with a 70/30 split. Using the open source software Weka, we trained three different J48
decision tree model with a pruning factor of 0.02 (results are not changing significantly for
other choices of the factor). The first model (called
features, the second model, called

has been trained using all the

, has been trained using market-related features

(stock and index historical prices) and the third model (

) has been trained using

SNA-related features.
The following figures describe the results for the three classifiers. The key metrics used to
compare the models are based on the analysis of the confusion matrix, such as precision,
recall, F-measure. Although trials were performed for each model, the performance of the
models did not show high variance and therefore the data presented are good
representative of a typical performance for each model.
=== Summary ===
Number of Leaves :
Size of the tree : 20

13

Correctly Classified Instances
Incorrectly Classified Instances
Kappa statistic
Mean absolute error
Root mean squared error
Relative absolute error
Root relative squared error
Total Number of Instances

120
24
0.6468
0.1755
0.3797
37.1309 %
78.1412 %
144

83.5052 %
16.4948 %

=== Detailed Accuracy By Class ===
TP Rate

FP Rate

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

ROC Area

Class
Weighted Avg.

0.757
0.883
0.835

0.117
0.243
0.195

0.8
0.855
0.834

0.757
0.883
0.835

0.778
0.869
0.834

0.861
0.861
0.861

0
1

=== Confusion Matrix ===
a
42
11

b
12
78

<-- classified as
| a = 0
| b = 1

Figure 10 Typical performance of the

model.
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=== Summary ===
Number of Leaves :
Size of the tree : 15

8

Correctly Classified Instances
Incorrectly Classified Instances
Kappa statistic
Mean absolute error
Root mean squared error
Relative absolute error
Root relative squared error
Total Number of Instances

119
25
0.6267
0.1954
0.4008
41.3502 %
82.4754 %
144

82.4742 %
17.5258 %

=== Detailed Accuracy By Class ===
TP Rate

FP Rate

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

ROC Area

Class
Weighted Avg.

0.757
0.867
0.825

0.133
0.243
0.201

0.778
0.852
0.824

0.757
0.867
0.825

0.767
0.86
0.824

0.827
0.827
0.827

0
1

=== Confusion Matrix ===
a
41
11

b
<-- classified as
13 | a = 0
78 | b = 1

Figure 11 Typical performance of the
=== Summary ===
Number of Leaves :
Size of the tree : 32

price model.

19

Correctly Classified Instances
Incorrectly Classified Instances
Kappa statistic
Mean absolute error
Root mean squared error
Relative absolute error
Root relative squared error
Total Number of Instances

93
51
0.2415
0.3531
0.5444
74.7013 %
112.0202 %
144

64.5833 %
35.4166 %

=== Detailed Accuracy By Class ===
TP Rate

FP Rate

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

ROC Area

Class
Weighted Avg.

0.486
0.75
0.649

0.25
0.514
0.413

0.545
0.703
0.643

0.486
0.75
0.649

0.514
0.726
0.645

0.68
0.68
0.68

0
1

=== Confusion Matrix ===
a
28
21

b
26 |
68 |

<-- classified as
a = 0
b = 1

Figure 12 Typical performance of the

model.
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Model

Correct
predictions

Precision

Recall

F-Measure

120/144

0.834

0.835

0.834

119/144

0.824

0.825

0.827

93/144

0.643

0.649

0.645

Table 17 Summary of Precision, Recall and F measure results

5.1.11 EXPERIMENT 3: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
There is a clear distinction among the two models that includes market-related features
and

and the

model. The

and the

model has high and

very similar performance, with an accuracy of about 82%-83%. In general, this represents
an extremely high value considering the fact that stock market prices forecast is a hard
task and there is a strong consensus in literature that stock market prices behave like
random walks and therefore cannot be predicted. However, in period of sustained market
trend (such as 2011-2014), similar numbers have been reported in literature. For instance,
Bollen (2010) studied the predictive capability of Twitter discussions and he reported an
accuracy of 83.3% in predicting the closing price of the S&P 500 index in October 2010.
However, the main result of our analysis is not the absolute level of accuracy of the
predictors, but the fact that the addition of SNA metrics to the feature set did not add any
value.

and the

have comparable performance, meaning that a classifier based

on historical prices only has the same predictive capabilities of a classifier based on
historical prices and SNA metrics. Moreover, the

model, only based on SNA

metrics, has an accuracy of around 65%, underperforming the other two classifiers by
about 18%. Moreover, an accuracy of 65% is still significantly higher than a naïve zerorule classifier (62% positive case, 38% negative case).
Therefore, it can be concluded that online communities’ metrics has little or no predictive
value in helping predicting the future price of stocks.
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5.1.12 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have presented a set of experiments to analyse how online financial
communities and the market react to geopolitical events related to conflicts, war and
political instability.
Our experiment on online communities of investors showed how the dynamics of such
communities do change in the 2 days immediately after a geopolitical crisis. The
discussions are bigger, more intense, centralised and they gravitate around a few group of
individuals that appear to be authoritative users leading the discussion and connecting the
remaining actors in the networks. This effect fades rapidly one week from the event and it
disappears after 1 month.
Our price analysis revealed how military stocks significantly increase their price one week
after a geo-political event. However, the market itself, represented by the S&P 500 index,
also increased its price significantly. Both of the effects are present 1 week after the event,
while they are present with a smaller effect 1 day after. The comparison between the S&P
500 and seven military stocks considered shows how military stocks outperformed the
market, but the gap is significant only with a confidence level of 0.85%.
Finally, experiment 3 showed how SNA metrics before and during a geo-political event do
not add predictive value to the task of predicting future price movements 1 week after an
event. A classifier based only on historical prices outperformed a classifier based on SNA
metrics by 18%, while a classifier obtained by merging historical prices and SNA metrics
exhibited similar performance to the price-based classifier.
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CHAPTER 6
6

CONCLUSION

This chapter will look to summarise the findings of the experiments in an attempt to
answer the research questions.
6.1

RESEARCH DEFINITION AND RESEARCH OVERVIEW

As described in the outset of this thesis the research question is concerned with the
following questions and is broken down into the following subsections.
6.1.1 HOW DO ONLINE FINANCIAL COMMUNITIES REACT TO MILITARY AND TERRORIST
GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS

The frequency range examined was a period of 2, 5 and 20 days. The SNA metrics taken
into consideration were nodes, edges, density, centrality, betweenness, modularity, Gini
index and diameter. The results established that after a period of two days the SNA
metrics are considerably higher. In most cases geopolitical events generate an intensified
communication, with an increase number of actors within the online community and a
more centralised network.
6.1.2 HOW DOES THE STOCK MARKET REACT TO MILITARY AND TERRORIST GEOPOLITICAL
EVENTS

The aim of the test was to establish if the stock price of the seven US military stocks after
geopolitical events differs significantly from the price before the events. The results
established that after one week of geopolitical events, the price of military stocks is higher
than the price before the event using a confidence level of 0.99%.
6.1.3 CAN MILITARY STOCK PRICES BE PREDICTED AFTER A MILITARY OR TERRORIST
GEOPOLITICAL EVENT

The objective was to establish if it was possible to predict the price of military stocks one
week after a geopolitical event based on a set of features including SNA metrics, historical
prices and S&P 500 index prices. The evidence concluded that online community’s
metrics has little or no predictive value in helping predicting the future price of stocks.
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6.2

LIMITATIONS

There was a huge data set collected for this thesis. This included the Somali Pirate crises,
French intervention in Mali, the Iraq 2003 war, the Iran nuclear crisis and North Korean
nuclear crises. The collected data also included the news for each day per stock in
conjunction with a news sentiment rating. Further work identified where various military
stocks were linked to associated military stocks on the same Bloomberg stock news page.
It was deducted that recent military operations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe
would serve as a foundation for these experiments as these geopolitical events are quite
recent and familiar to the general population.
6.3

FUTURE WORK AND RESEARCH

There are many research question open for future work such as from a real-time
perspective can an investment bank influence a single actor or a cluster of actors on the
network in terms of spreading good sentiment to boost single military stock activity, or in
the opposite case decrease military stock activity? Is it possible to identify an actor or
influencer on the network that is profitable to the Investment Bank? Is it possible to
uncover hidden networks that have hidden agenda’s to influence stock market prices?
What influence the collected sentiment has on the stock prices, geopolitical events and the
S&P 500.

Future research could also use text mining with predictive mining for

geopolitical events.
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